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Abstract
I consider how heterogeneity in capital goods aects international trade patterns,
and I show a novel source of comparative advantage: the magnitude of capital goods
heterogeneity. Capital goods are heterogeneous in their vintage and productivity, and
due to capacity constraints, only productive capital goods are activated in the equilib-
rium. Through this selection, the distribution of capital goods determines the industry-
level productivity: industry-level productivity is higher in an industry with relatively
larger variation in capital goods, and hence in a perfectly competitive two-country,
two-good, two-factor equilibrium, the industry has Ricardian comparative advantage.
An extension of the model, including xed trade cost, describes a sorting situation
in which the most productive production units (which are generally newer vintage)
export, the moderately productive units serve the domestic market, and the least pro-
ductive units (older) do not operate.
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1 Introduction
While investment drives several aspects of aggregate economy, trade models frequently ab-
stract investment decisions regarding capital goods by considering an endowment economy.
In models that include investment decision, capital goods are commonly assumed to be ho-
mogeneous. However, an important empirical aspect of capital goods is heterogeneity in
productivity. Some capital goods are more productive than others within an industry.
This paper considers the role of investment and productivity heterogeneity of capital
goods in the pattern of international trade. Specically, I introduce putty-clay production
technology in the style of Gilchrist and Williams (2000, 2004, 2005) into an international
trade model considered by Baxter (1992), and discover that the magnitude of heterogeneity
in capital goods is a source of Ricardian comparative advantage.
Baxter (1992) includes endogenous capital accumulation, intertemporal optimization and
neoclassical production function in the classical \2 by 2 by 2" (two-country, two-good, and
two-factor) international trade model. She shows that in the steady-state of the dynamic
economy, the pattern of comparative advantage is described as a Ricardian model, com-
pared to the classical endowment \2 by 2 by 2" model that implies a Heckscher-Ohlin trade
pattern. Intuitively, since returns to investment are determined by the user cost, which is
ultimately determined by the subjective discount factor and the capital depreciation rate,
the amount of capital is fully adjusted so that the returns to investment are equalized across
industries. As a result, the economy eectively has only one input (labor) as in the Ricardian
model. The relative price of goods under autarky is determined by the ratio of productivities
across industries, and this relative price predicts the pattern of specialization that occurs
when countries are engaged in trade. Baxter's result indicates the importance of explicitly
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considering investment decisions when capital goods exist. However, she does not consider
heterogeneity in capital goods.
Accumulated empirical evidence shows that even in a narrowly dened industry, the
quality (i.e., productivity and capital-intensity) of capital goods diers signicantly across
rms (Goolsbee, 2004; Foster et al., 2008). A large dierence in capital goods presents
even within rms (e.g., Goolsbee and Gross, 2000).1 Theoretically, a part of productivity
dierence is caused by the capacity constraint and the inexibility (e.g., irreversibility) of
capital goods (Cooper and Haltiwanger, 2006). Without capacity constraint, production
occurs only for the most productive capital good. Besides, inexibility is important. If
capital goods could be instantaneously adjusted at no additional cost, rms would adjust
the quality of capital goods according to their economic environment.
One source of heterogeneity in capital goods is vintage. New capital goods tend be
more productive than older ones, thanks to technological progress. For example, using
U.S. manufacturing plant data, Jensen et al. (2001) show that new entrants in recent years
are signicantly more productive than past entrants in their entry year. Another source
of heterogeneity is idiosyncratic productivity variations among capital goods of the same
vintage. For example, among the same make and model of equipment (industrial, mining,
and farming machines, and oce and transportation-related equipment), some machines
malfunction, which requires a series of inspections and repairs, and eectively renders them
less productive than other machines of the make and model.2 Since industrial machines such
as assembly lines, supercomputers, transportation equipment and farm equipment, have
become more and more complex and consist of many parts and/or computerized functions, a
1Goolsbee and Gross (2000) use data from airline companies. Obviously, capital goods (aircrafts) dier
in their quality (e.g., capacity and fuel eciency) even within the same airline company.
2Typical examples are transportation, construction and farm equipment (e.g., vehicles, dump tracks and
combine harversters). This type of troubles is suciently common such that in the U.S., lemon laws (at
the federal level, the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act) protect consumers by ensuring appropriate recourse
for compensation in the transaction of consumer vehicles and some other goods. However, the application
of lemon laws for business vehicles is limited. For farming, a similar problem of new \lemon" machines
is an important issue. Mechanical deciencies lower the productivity of machines. Moreover, during the
inspection and repairs, the machines cannot be operated, and hence eective productivity is much lower.
The application of lemon laws to farming equipment depends on individual states.
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malfunction in one part of the machinery often leads to a breakdown of the entire machinery
(\O-ring" theory: Kremer, 1993; Jones, 2011). Such variation leads to ex post productivity
variations among ex ante same capital goods.
Putty-clay production technology is attractive for analyzing heterogeneity in capital
goods since the approach incorporates vintage, capacity constraint, investment irreversibility,
and endogenous utilization decision. Gilchrist and Williams (2000, 2005) introduce putty-
clay technology into a closed-economy single-industry business cycle model. Capital goods
(called \machines") have distinct vintage and idiosyncratic productivity. The machine-level
labor-productivity depends on endogenously chosen capital-intensity and an exogenously de-
termined idiosyncratic productivity component. This idiosyncratic productivity component
is determined after the determination of capital-intensity. Once a machine is built, it is im-
possible to change its capital-intensity or to revert to investment goods. Moreover, capacity
is constrained: the operational choice is to allocate one worker to each machine or to keep
the machine idle.3
Under this heterogeneous capital setting, the aggregate production function in the steady
state is represented as a standard Cobb-Douglas function, but its Solow residual is determined
in part by the capital heterogeneity. With machine heterogeneity, less productive machines
are not protable, and hence not used in the equilibrium. Gilchrist and Williams (2005) show
that a temporary increase in the idiosyncratic productivity variation provides an economy-
wide productivity benet through the optimal reallocation of variable factors, which is labor,
across machines. That is, a change in the variance of idiosyncratic productivity component
leads to a change in the aggregate productivity.
3Johansen (1972, chap. 9), Fuss (1977), Lasserre (1985) and Salvanes and Tveteras (2004) empirically
conrm these key characterizations of putty-clay production technology using various micro-level data. In
the context of the transportation, construction and farm equipment examples in Footnote 2, putty-clay works
as follows. First, before installation or adoption, a rm can choose the size of, for example, dump tracks, but
the size cannot be changed afterwards. The choice of the size determines capital-intensity because a dump
track requires only one operator at a time. Some dump trucks experience a series of mechanical troubles
(\lemons"), and possibly cannot be used. Productivity over a certain period of time becomes low or zero
for these lemons. Production machines experiencing mechanical troubles also may produce products that do
not meet quality standards. This also leads to low idiosyncratic productivity.
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Introducing this putty-clay technology into an international model considered by Baxter
(1992), I nd a novel source of comparative advantage: the heterogeneity of capital goods. In
the steady-state of the dynamic \2 by 2 by 2" economy, trade pattern and gains from trade
are generally described by Ricardian comparative advantage, as in Baxter (1992). Under
autarky, dierences in the magnitude of machine-level productivity heterogeneity across
industries lead to dierences in industry-level productivity. Larger machine-level variation
provides an industry-level productivity benet through the optimal allocation of labor across
machines since less productive machines are not used in the equilibrium. Hence, an industry
with larger idiosyncratic variation has higher industry-level productivity than an industry
with less variation, and the price of the good is lower than the price of the other good.
Moreover, in the industry-level aggregation, the production is represented as a Cobb-Douglas
function, and the contribution of heterogeneity appears in a part of the Solow residual. By
considering costless trade equilibrium, since the dierence in the relative price under autarky
determines the pattern of specialization, a country specializes in an industry with relatively
larger capital goods heterogeneity. In this sense, trade is based on the technology-driven
(i.e., Ricardian) comparative advantage, and the industry-level Solow residual is useful to
predict trade pattern.
As an extension, I present the model with a xed trade cost, and show that the model
describes a situation in which the most productive (typically newer) machines export, mod-
erately productive machines serve the domestic market, and the least productive (older)
machines do not operate. This sorting implication is closely related to recent empirical
literature ndings (e.g., Bernard and Jensen, 1997, 1999; Bernard et al., 2003; Tomiura,
2007). While a popular explanation of this type of sorting developed by Melitz (2003) ap-
peals to productivity heterogeneity, xed costs of operation and exporting, and monopolistic
competition, my model oers a fundamentally dierent mechanism of sorting based on the
combination of productivity heterogeneity, xed exporting cost, and capacity constraint.
Essentially, since each machine faces capacity constraints, a machine is used for its most
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protable operation. If the price of a good is higher in the foreign country, but delivering
the good to the foreign country requires a xed trade cost, exporting is protable only for the
most productive machines. Moreover, the model provides a prediction regarding the sorting
and vintage. When technology is gradually improving and capital-embodied, a newer ma-
chine tends to be more productive and hence a newer machine is more likely to be used for
exporting.
Even with the introduction of the xed trade cost, the overall trade pattern is described
as a Ricardian model. In general, a country produces more on the product with compar-
ative advantage. The gains from trade are hence the combined and interactive results of
the reallocation across industries (a reallocation that itself arises by exploiting comparative
advantage), and reallocation across machines within an industry.
This paper oers new insights into three distinct research programs: (1) the source of
comparative advantage, (2) rm-level trade, and (3) implications of putty-clay technology
and micro-production based theories of aggregate productivity.
The source of comparative advantage has been the central subject of international trade
studies (e.g., Feenstra, 2004). Traditionally, the comparative advantage results from a coun-
try's industry-level technology and aggregate factor endowment.4 Emerging literature con-
siders dierences in the distribution of skill across labor as a source of comparative advantage
(Grossman and Maggi, 2000; Antras et al., 2006; Bougheas and Riezman, 2007; Ohnsorge
and Treer, 2007). In particular, these studies underscore that a country with a concentrated
skill distribution (e.g., Germany) has comparative advantage in an industry requiring many
moderately skilled workers (e.g., precision machinery), while a country with sparse skill dis-
tribution (e.g., Italy) has a comparative advantage in an industry requiring a few outstanding
experts (e.g., fashion design). While this logic is intuitive and appealing, another important
aspect of heterogeneous distribution is selection mechanism, which my paper also empha-
sizes. Moreover, the distribution in my model is endogenously determined in the sense that
4Costinot (2009) organizes traditional theories of comparative advantage, and shows conditions of tech-
nology and factor endowment to emerge comparative advantages.
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capital-intensity is optimally chosen based on the knowledge of distribution of idiosyncratic
productivity variation.
Second, my model adds a new view to micro-level trade literature. The sorting implication
in my extended model is closely related to Melitz (2003), and an analysis regarding the gains
from trade in this extended model resembles the way Bernard et al. (2007) applied Melitz
(2003) to two industries. In the context of the sorting, the vast majority of the model
is a version of Melitz (2003) in which monopolistic competition is an essential feature in
addition to the underlying assumption, namely, the love of variety.5 A potential problem
is that the assumption of the love of variety is too critical in the welfare analysis, and
the literature attempts to organize the contribution of monopolistic competition and its
parameterization to the welfare implications of rm-level trade models (c.f., Arkolakis et al.,
2010, 2012; Behrens and Murata, 2011). An alternative view to sorting helps clarify the
relationship between sorting in destination and gains from trade. In addition, my model
oers several additional empirical predictions regarding the exporting status and vintage of
capital goods: a rm with newer vintage machines is more likely to be an exporter; among
exporters, export intensity is higher for the rm with newer vintage machines; and a rm
starts exporting after an installation of new and productive machines. These predictions will
be empirically pursued in future research.
Finally, the paper contributes to the literature of putty-clay technology and micro-
production based theories of aggregate productivity. After Johansen (1959) introduced
putty-clay technology, researchers intensively studied it from the 1960s to 80s mainly in
the context of growth and investment models.6 The original idea is that in the aggregate
production function, ex ante capital-intensity is freely chosen (\putty" or Cobb-Douglas
function), but cannot be changed ex post (\clay" or Leontief function). Three papers from
that era are closely related to my paper: Inada (1966) considers a two-sector Solow model
5A notable exception is a model by Bernard et al. (2003), who introduce Bertrand competition into a
model of Eaton and Kortum (2002).
6See footnote 1 of Gilchrist and Williams (2000).
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with putty-clay technology; Grossman (1983), a trade application, considers the implications
of a putty-clay production (without investment decision) to compare the specic-factor and
Heckscher-Ohlin trade models; and Eaton (1979), another international application, exam-
ines the implication of exchange rate change on the allocation of factors. These classical
papers assume exogenous investment decisions. A modern revival of putty-clay technol-
ogy, with endogeneous investment decision, includes Atkeson and Kehoe (1999), Gilchrist
and Williams (2000, 2004, 2005), Wei (2003), Birchenall (2004), Gourio (2011) and Choi
and Rios-Rull (2012). In addition, the version of putty-clay in my paper, which relies on
Gilchrist and Williams (2005), introduces heterogeneity in productivity across machines, and
analyzes the industry-level productivity. This micro-founded analysis of aggregate produc-
tivity has its roots in a classical analysis by Houthakker (1955{56).7 These papers focus on
implications of business cycle, labor market or asset price in dynamic single-industry closed-
economy settings. None of the recent papers features multi-industry and/or multi-country
implications.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is the main section of the paper,
which rst describes the investment decision problem, and then introduces this investment
decision problem into a classical \2 by 2 by 2" economy with endogenous capital accumulation
and intertemporal decision. Section 3 is an extension of the baseline model, in which xed
trade cost is included, and shows the implication of the sorting in destination. Section 4
concludes.
2 Model
The heart of the model is the investment decision problem and its steady-state implications.
The problem extends Gilchrist and Williams (2005) by including two industries. The invest-
ment decision involves an explicit dynamic stochastic problem, while the focus of the paper
7Related to Houthakker (1955{56) but distinct from studies based on putty-clay technology, Lagos (2006)
also incorporates a Leontief micro-structure based on Houthakker (1955{56) with a search-and-matching
model for explaining measured total factor productivity.
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is its steady-state. After describing the investment problem, I combine the problem into
the \2 by 2 by 2" economy with endogenous capital accumulation. Following the tradition
of trade literature, I rst consider a relative price of two goods under autarky, and then I
analyze an open-economy equilibrium without trade cost. There are two countries, two nal
goods, and two factors of production. Final good A is used just for consumption, while nal
good B is used for both consumption and investment. Factors of production are capital
and labor. Importantly, capital is endogenously accumulated. Time is discrete, and denoted
by t = 0; :::;1. Countries are indexed by subscript i = 1; 2, and industries are distinct by
superscript  = A;B.
2.1 Dynamic problem
The investment decision model is stated with explicit treatment of uncertainty and dynamics.
I rst state the problem of the households, and then consider the investment problem.
2.1.1 Households
In each country i, there is a stand-in household. Households inelastically supply homogeneous
labor Li.
8 Households consume both good A and B. Let ci;t denote consumption of goods
 in country i at period t. The utility function is additively separable across time, and the
period-utility is homothetic and identical across countries:
E0
1X
t=0
tu(cAi;t; c
B
i;t); (1)
where  is the subjective discount factor of the household. For simplicity of calculation, I
use log-utility:
u(cAi;t; c
B
i;t) = (1  ) ln cAi;t +  ln cBi;t: (2)
8Including a leisure-labor choice is straightforward, and it does not change any implications. See Ap-
pendix.
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The second good is used for consumption and investment. The intertemporal decision be-
tween period t and t + s is summarized by the ratio of the marginal utilities of the second
goods at t and t+s (i.e., the \stochastic discount factor" in the macro-nance terminology):
mi;t;t+s = 
s
@ui;t+s=@c
B
i;t+s
@ui;t=@cBi;t
: (3)
2.1.2 Investment problem
Production takes place in a unit called \machine." In each period and for each industry, a set
of investment opportunities to create new machines becomes available. Households determine
capital-intensity of machines, and the number (quantity) of machines to be installed. At the
time of investment, technology is constant-returns-to-scale, and the size of each machine is
normalized to employ a maximum of one unit of labor. Once capital-intensity is determined,
the investment is irreversible, and there is no substitutability between capital and labor.
Investment is subject to idiosyncratic variation in productivity. After the determination
of the capital-intensity, the productivity is randomly drawn from a known log-normal dis-
tribution, which is industry- and country-specic. The productivity variation is a source of
heterogeneity across machines within a vintage of capital goods. Each machine in a vintage
is distinguished by an index . The log-productivity of a machine  of industry  in country
i installed at period t is:
ln i;t()  N
 
ln i;t   0:5i2; i2

: (4)
The mean productivity is E(i()) = 

i;t by the adjustment of  0:5i2 of the log-normal dis-
tribution. Log-normal is empirically relevant (Campbell, 1998) and theoretically convenient
(Gilchrist and Williams, 2000, 2005).
The capital-intensity of a newly installed machine is the same within an industry and a
country, since the investment project is ex ante identical. By installing ki;t units of investment
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goods, the capital's contribution to labor-productivity is ki;t
. The parameter  2 (0; 1)
directly controls marginal product of capital.9 At period t+ s, a machine installed at period
t (vintage t) can produce yi;t+s() units of goods  if one unit of labor is assigned:
yi;t+s() = 

i;t()k

i;t
li;t+s(); where l

i;t+s() 2 [0; 1]: (5)
If a machine is not used at a period, it remains idle at no cost.
Each period after the initial production (which takes place at t + 1), machines have a
constant probability  of breaking down regardless of vintage, productivity, capital-intensity,
industry or country.
The optimization problem at the time of capital-intensity decision (t) is:
max
ki;t;fli;t+s()2[0;1]g1s=1
 pkt ki;t + Et
" 1X
s=1
mi;t;t+s(1  )s 1
 
pi;t+si;t()k

i;t
   wt+s

li;t+s()
#
;
(6)
where pki;t is the price of the investment goods (which is p
B
i;t under the current specication),
mi;t;t+s is the stochastic discount factor, and the expectation operator Et takes over the time
t idiosyncratic productivity dierence and all the other values at and after period t+1. The
capital-intensity is chosen to maximize expected prots conditional on the known distribution
but not on the realization of the idiosyncratic productivity. This optimization problem
includes decisions about each of the dierent machines (), and directly solving the problem
is dicult. However, the problem is simplied by introducing a variable summarizing a
cut-o decision.
At period t+s, the revenue from operating a machine is pi;t+s

i;t()k

i;t
, while the cost is
wi;t+s. By optimization, the decision follows a cut-o rule: one unit of labor is assigned if it
is protable (pi;t+s

i;t()k

i;t
  wi;t+s), and no labor is assigned if it is not protable. Let f
9It is straightforward to make the share parameter  diers across industries, but the assumption of the
common share parameter is useful to highlight the role of level and variance of productivity.
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denote the probability distribution function of i;t(). As shown in Appendix, the expected
labor-use at period t+ s for a machine built at period t is as:
(1  )s 1
Z 1
wi;t+s
p
i;t+s
k
i;t

f(

i;t()jwi;t+s; pi;t+s; i;t)di;t()
=(1  )s 1  1    zi;t;t+s ; (7)
where (:) is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution, and
zi;t;t+s 
1
i
ln

wi;t+s
pi;t+s

i;tk

i;t


+ 0:5i : (8)
Among machines built at period t, less productive machines are kept idle, while more pro-
ductive machines are in operation. The variable zi;t;t+s summarizes the cuto, which in
general depends not only on the time t + s but also the vintage s. As shown in Appendix,
the expected output is also expressed by (:) as:
(1  )s 1
0@Z 1
wi;t+s
p
i;t+s
k
i;t

i;t()k

i;t
f
 
i;t()jwi;t+s; pi;t+s; i;t

di;t()
1A
=(1  )s 1  1    zi;t;t+s   i i;tki;t: (9)
The term 1   zi;t;t+s   i is a capacity utilization rate, i.e., the ratio of output produced
from the capital goods installed at t to the level of maximum output using the capital goods.10
Using (7) and (9), at period t+ s the expected net income of a surviving machine build at t
is as:
pi;t+s
 
1    zi;t;t+s   i i;tki;t   wi;t+s  1    zi;t;t+s : (10)
10The inside of (:) is z , not z. This adjustment comes from the use of truncated expectation formula.
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The rst derivative of this equation with respect to zi;t;t+s is:
0 =  pi;t+s
 
zi;t;t+s   i

i;tk

i;t
 + wi;t+s
 
zi;t;t+s

; (11)
where (:) is the probability density function of the standard normal distribution. Using the
functional form of (:), a rearrangement of this expression (11) leads to equation (8). This
means that the capital-intensity decision problem (6) involving a machine-level problem can
be rewritten in an industry-level problem using zi;t;t+s as an additional variable:
max
ki;t;fzi;t;t+sg1s=1
  pki;tki;t + Et
" 1X
s=1
mi;t;t+s(1  )s 1
  pi;t+s  1    zi;t;t+s   i i;tki;t   wi;t+s  1    zi;t;t+s
#
: (12)
The rst order condition with respect to zi;t;t+s is (11), or equivalently, (8). Depending on
the prices, ki;t could be zero. When the investment is positive, the rst order condition is
the rst derivative with respect to ki;t,
11 and hence:
0 =  pki;t + Et
" 1X
s=1
mi;t;t+s(1  )s 1pi;t+s
 
1    zi;t;t+s   i i;tki;t 1
#
: (13)
Once a machine is installed, each machine earns positive prots if it operates. An equilibrium
requires expected prots to be zero. Such a condition, a free-entry, implies that:
pki;tk

i;t =Et
" 1X
s=1
mi;t;t+s(1  )s 1
  pi;t+s  1    zi;t;t+s   i i;tki;t   wi;t+s  1    zi;t;t+s
#
: (14)
This free-entry condition, together with the resource constraints presented below, determines
the total number of newly installed machines in each industry, qi;t.
11Precisely, a change in ki;t changes future decisions of z

i;t;t+s. By the envelope condition (11), this
indirect eect does not appear in (13).
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2.1.3 Industry aggregation
Total labor-use in the industry  is the sum of labor requirements of all existing machines:
li;t =
1X
s=1
(1  )s 1  1    zi;t s;t qi;t s (15)
and the total production of industry  is:
yi;t =
1X
s=1
(1  )s 1  1    zi;t s;t   i i;t ski;t sqi;t s: (16)
The total gross investment for industry  at period t is the product of the number of machines
and their capital-intensity, ki;tq

i;t. In each period,  fraction of capital goods is exogenously
broken. If a researcher uses a standard perpetual inventory method to calculate capital stock
of industry , the calculated industry-level capital stock Ki;t follows the usual transition
expression:
Ki;t+1 = (1  )Ki;t + ki;tqi;t: (17)
2.1.4 Resource constraints and other conditions
The rst goods are pure consumption goods, while the second goods are consumption and
investment goods. The resource constraints are:
NX
i=1
yAi;t =
NX
i=1
cAi;t; (18)
NX
i=1
yBi;t =
NX
i=1
 
cBi;t + k
A
i;tq
A
i;t + k
B
i;tq
B
i;t

; (19)
lAi;t + l
B
i;t = Li;t: (20)
There is one country (N = 1) under autarky, and two (N = 1; 2) under costless trade. Since
the second goods are used as investment goods, the price of the investment goods is that of
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the second goods:
pki;t = p
B
i;t: (21)
Under costless trade, pt = p

1;t = p

2;t. I also impose a period-by-period trade balance:
pAt (y
A
it   cAit) + pBt
 
yBit   cBit   kAitqAit   kBit qBit

= 0: (22)
A competitive equilibrium of the economy is dened as usual: sequences of prices and
quantities that are consistent with the household's optimization, the investment decision,
the resource constraints, and conditions on prices. For costless trade equilibrium, the trade
balance is also required.
2.2 Steady-state implications of zero-growth economy
In the rest of the paper, the analysis focuses on the steady-state/balanced-growth equilibrium
in which all the variables stay constant, and the distribution of machines is stationary. In
particular, the analysis starts from a case without trend growth. The mean productivity is
constant over time E(i()) = 

i;t = 

i. Under this assumption, I can show many results
analytically.
2.2.1 The investment problem
The variables in the steady-state are expressed without time subscripts, for example, kit = k

i .
The stochastic discount factor mi;t;t+s dened by (3) is replaced by 
s. Let R denote the
steady-state user cost:
R =
1

  1 + : (23)
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The variable of the cut-o decision in general depends both on time and vintage. In the
steady-state, the right-hand-side of (8) depends on neither, and hence zi is constant within
industry and country. The utilization decision condition (11) is as:
0 =  pi (zi   ) iki + wi (zi) : (24)
Similarly, equations (13) and (14) are as:
pki k

i =

R
pi (1   (zi   i)) iki; (25)
pki k

i =

1  
1
R
w (1   (zi)) : (26)
Combining (24), (25) and (26) leads to the following equation, which pins down zi :
1   =  (z

i   i) = (1   (zi   i))
 (zi) = (1   (zi))
: (27)
Lemma 1. Equation (27) has a unique solution, and dzi=d

i > 1: (Gilchrist and Williams,
2005)
The proof is given by Gilchrist and Williams (2005).12 Lemma 1 implies that zi depends
only on  and i . It does not depend on the mean productivity 

i, the real wage wi, or the
prices of the good pi and investment goods p
k
i . Since Gilchrist and Williams (2005) analyze a
single-industry economy, the nding that zi does not depend on the prices is not surprising.
However, equation (27) shows that even with a two-industry extension, the steady-state
operation decision does not depend on the prices.
12The basic idea of the proof is to calculate the upper limit (which is unity) and lower limit (which is
zero) of the right-hand-side, and to show monotonicity of the right-hand-side with respect to z. The sign of
the derivative is determined by the implicit function theorem.
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The aggregation equations (15) and (16) are as:
li =
1

(1   (zi)) qi ; (28)
yi =
1

(1   (zi   i)) ikiqi : (29)
By combining (25), (26), (28), and (29):
(1  )piyi = wili: (30)
that is, labor's income share is constant. This condition motivates Cobb and Douglas (1928)
to discover the famous functional form. Hence, in the steady-state, this putty-clay micro-
structure is observationally consistent with industry-level Cobb-Douglas technology.
Moreover, from (17), the implied industry capital stock is as:
Ki =
1

kiq

i ; (31)
and combining this with (28) and (29) leads to an expression of the industry-level production
function as:
yi =
1

(1   (zi   i)) ikiqi
=
1

(1   (zi   i)) iki
 
li (1   (zi)) 1
1 
qi

=i
1  (zi   i)
(1  (zi))1 
Ki
li
1 : (32)
In the steady-state the industry-level aggregate production function is exactly Cobb-Douglas
form. Its Solow residual has two components: the part coming from the mean productivity,
and the part coming from the magnitude of heterogeneity.13 A straightforward calculation
13This aggregate representation of Cobb-Douglas production function based on the putty-clay micro-
structure is available in the steady-state of a single-good setting. Gilchrist and Williams (2000, 2005) do
not explicitly present this representation, although they study the eect of a short-run change in  on the
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shows that the Solow residual is increasing in i .
Lemma 2. The Solow residual in the steady-state is increasing in the parameter i.
Proof. For notational simplicity, both superscripts and subscripts are dropped. By taking
the rst derivative:
@Solow
@
=
  (z   )
(1  (z))1 

dz
d
  1

+ (1  ) 1  (z   )
(1  (z))2 (z)
dz
d

=
1  (z   )
(1  (z))1 
  (z   )
(1  (z   ))

dz
d
  1

+ (1  ) (z)
(1  (z))
dz
d

=
1  (z   )
(1  (z))1 
  (z   )
(1  (z   ))

dz
d
  1

+
(z   )
(1  (z   ))
dz
d

=
(z   )
(1  (z))1  :
From the second to third line, equation (27) is used. Since all the terms in the last line are
positive, the rst derivative is positive.
The intuition behind this result is that large heterogeneity in productivity across machines
provides an industry-wide productivity benet through the optimal allocation of labor across
machines. In this model, less productive machines are not used. Large  means that the
distribution of machines (with respect to labor-productivity) is at; there are many highly
productive machines and many unproductive machines. The unproductive machines are
not suciently protable to cover the operational cost (wage), so they are kept idle. The
industry-level productivity is high since the production mainly takes place with productive
machines. On the contrary, small  means the productivity distribution is concentrated;
there are many \so-so" productive machines. Most of the machines are in operation, and
the industry-wide productivity gain through the selection is small. In an extreme case, if all
machines are the same, the industry-level productivity is the same as that of the individual
machines. The industry has no productivity gains from the selection.
aggregate productivity.
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The role of the selection in determining industry-level productivity becomes clear by
considering the capacity utilization rate. As shown in (9) the term 1   (z   ) is the
capacity utilization rate of the industry. Note that (:) is a monotonically increasing function
because it is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution. Since
dz=d > 1 (by Lemma 1) and (:) is monotonically increasing, the capacity utilization rate
1 (z  ) is monotonically decreasing in . In other words, the more productivity varies,
the more severe the selection. Together with the previous result,
Lemma 3. In the steady-state there is a one-to-one relationship between the capacity uti-
lization rate 1 (zi  i) and the parameter i. The Solow residual is larger if the capacity
utilization rate is lower.
The statement appears to contradict a standard short-run argument that the productivity
(calculated without adjusting capacity utilization rate) is high if the capacity utilization rate
is high (e.g., Greenwood et al., 1988). The statement here is about the steady-state with
heterogeneous capital goods. Productivity is high if the steady-state capacity utilization rate
is low, because a low capacity utilization results from a severe selection.
In summary, a dierence in the productivity across capital goods is a source of the
industry-level productivity through the selection.
2.2.2 Autarky
I rst consider the implications of the putty-clay technology under autarky. For notational
simplicity, country subscript i will be dropped. The focus is the relative price of two industries
pB=pA. From equations (25) and (26), the relative price is:
pB
pA
=
A
B
1 (zA A)
(1 (zA))1 
1 (zB B)
(1 (zB))1 
: (33)
The relative price is the inverse of the ratio of the Solow residuals. If A = B and A = B,
then zA = zB and the relative price is 1. If A = B but A 6= B, then the relative price
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depends only on the mean productivities, as in the classical Ricardian model. If A 6= B,
since the Solow residual is increasing in ,
Proposition 1. Under autarky, the relative price pB=pA depends only on the capital share
parameter , the levels  and variations  of productivities. It does not depend on the
demand conditions. The relative price pB=pA is monotonically increasing in A, and mono-
tonically decreasing in B.
Under autarky, the relative price is determined by technology. Intuitively, since the
amount of capital is adjustable, and is determined by the user cost, labor is eectively the
only input used to determine the relative supply. However, labor is homogeneous, and hence
wage is adjusted to be consistent with relative technology. Consequently, the relative price
is purely determined by technology. This logic is the same as that used for an economy with
the neoclassical production technology (Baxter, 1992).
Adding to the mean productivity, the variance plays a role in the putty-clay setting. This
eect occurs because, contrary to standard neoclassical production function, productivity is
heterogeneous across machines. Less productive machines are not used since they are not
protable. Due to this industry-level selection, productivity is higher if the distribution is
atter. The parameter  determines the variability of productivity distribution, and hence
the relative price is lower for a sector with higher .
In this model, however, not just exogenous distribution but also endogenous investment
plays an important role in determining labor productivity. In particular, under autarky,
capital-intensity decision actually attenuates the selection mechanism. A rearrangement of
(26) leads to:
kB
kA
=
1  (zB)
1  (zA) : (34)
It is straightforward to obtain the rst derivative with respect to , for example, with respect
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to B:
dk
B
kA
dB
=
 (zB)
1  (zA)
dzB
dB
< 0: (35)
An industry with higher variation has lower capital-intensity. The dierence in the labor-
productivities across industries is not as large as the dierence in the exogenous productivity
component because in this model the labor-productivity is the product of the underlying
idiosyncratic productivity i() and the capital-intensity term k

i
. The endogenous nature
of a capital-intensity decision decreases the dierence between labor-productivities across
industries. In the industry with large  a machine with low labor-productivity will not be
used and hence it is \risky" to make a large capital-intensity investment for an individual
machine. Instead, investment is made mainly in increasing the number of machines (q). On
contrary, in the industry with , most of the machines will be used, so that investment is
directed toward developing the labor-productivity of each machine.
The capital-intensity of each machine k is not the same as the industry-level capital-labor
ratio K=l. From equations (26), (28), and (31):
K
l
=
1

kq
l
=

1  
w
R
1
pk
: (36)
The right-hand-side does not depend on industry , and hence industry-level capital-labor
ratios are the same across industries. The relative capital-labor ratio is not correlated with
the relative price. Accordingly, the industry-level capital-labor ratio does not contain any
useful information for predicting the comparative advantage. The important variable is
technology.
2.2.3 Two-country equilibrium without trade cost
Given the autarky relative price, it is straightforward to determine the pattern of specializa-
tion when two countries are engaged in costless trade. Two countries (country 1 and 2) are
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distinguished by subscript i = 1; 2. Without trade cost, the price must be equalized across
countries and hence pAi = p
A and pBi = p
B. Suppose that country 2 possesses comparative
advantage in producing good B, i.e., pB2 =p
A
2 < p
B
1 =p
A
1 . Country 2 then tends to specialize in
good B productions. If the price is so low (due to cheaper imported goods), then even very
productive machines of industry A in country 2 would earn negative prots.14 In this case,
the industry-level investment, labor and output are zero: yA2 = k
A
2 = q
A
2 = l
A
2 = 0, that is,
country 2 completely specializes.
0 y2,autarky
B y2
B
(2 producing only B)
y1
B+y2
B
(both producing only B)
p2
B/p2
A
p1
B/p1
A
Figure 1: World supply of good B
Given this structure, the rest of the equilibrium properties are parallel to the textbook
Ricardian model (e.g., Feenstra, 2004, Chapter 1). The relative price depends on the demand-
side. Figure 1 illustrates the world supply of good B, which is a typical \stair-step" pattern.
The vertical axis is the relative price. If the world relative price, pB=pA, turns out to be
smaller than the autarky relative price in country 2, both countries are fully specialized in
production of good A, and supply of good B is zero. If the relative price with trade is the
same as the autarky relative price in country 2, then country 2 produces both goods, while
country 1 completely specializes in the production of good A. Instead, if the relative price
is larger than the autarky relative price in country 1, both countries produce good B. If the
world relative price is in-between, country 1 specializes in good A and country 2 specializes
14Formally, for given prices (26) satises only if ki = 0. See Appendix for details.
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good B, and as shown in the Appendix, the relative price is given by:
pB
pA
=
 
+ 
R 
1  
!1 
A1
B2
1 (zA1  A1 )
(1 (zA1 ))
1 
1 (zB2  B2 )
(1 (zB2 ))
1 
; (37)
The results are summarized as:
Proposition 2. The world supply curve in the steady-state has a \stair-step" pattern. The
relative price under the complete specialization is determined by three dierent terms that
individually capture (1) demand condition, (2) mean productivities of the distributions, and
(3) relative dispersions of the productivities.
Other properties are also Ricardian. For example, trade improves welfare for both coun-
tries, although, in general, the wages are not equalized across countries. In this model,
welfare is precisely calculated by the household utility. In the Appendix, I show that (1)
trade is welfare improving for both countries, and (2) the wage dierence across countries
captures the dierence in the utility. Moreover, under the complete specialization, the wage
dierence across countries depends on demand for two goods.
2.2.4 Comparison
The model resembles the standard \2 by 2 by 1" Ricardian trade model, and the \2 by 2 by
2" economy with endogenous capital accumulation model of Baxter (1992).
If the production of each industry is given by a linear-in-labor technology, the model is
identical to the textbook \2 by 2 by 1" Ricardian trade model (e.g., Feenstra, 2004). In
particular, suppose that the industry-level production function is as:
yi = 

il

i; (38)
then the model is that of the classical Ricardian model.15 In this case, the relative price
15Notice that I follow macro-tradition in that the productivity i expresses marginal product of labor
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under the complete specialization is as:
pB
pA
=

1  
A1
B2
: (39)
The rst term captures the demand condition, while the second term captures the supply
condition. In the classical Ricardian model, capital accumulation is abstracted so that
there is no demand associated with investment. The demand is entirely determined by
consumption share parameter in the utility function, .
The second term captures the eect of technological dierence. If A1 is much higher than
B2 , then it is less costly to produce good A than good B, so that the world price of good A
is lower than the world price of good B.
If the industry-level production technology is as:
yi =

iK

i
li
1 ; (40)
where Ki is total capital stock in the industry, and capital accumulation follows the standard
law of motion:
Ki;t+1 = (1  )Ki;t + investmenti;t; (41)
then, this is a case analyzed by Baxter (1992), and the relative price under complete spe-
cialization is as:
pB
pA
=
 
+ 
R 
1  
!1 
A1
B2
: (42)
The rst term again captures the eect of the demand, while the second term captures the
technology. Contrary to the classical Ricardian model, the demand term reects not only
consumption demand but also the demand coming from investment motive, which is =(R 
rather than the marginal labor requirement as is common in trade literature.
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). The second term, capturing the technology, is the same as the classical Ricardian model.
This is the nding by Baxter (1992), that is, since the capital is endogenously determined,
technology, not the endowment, is the determinant of the comparative advantage and the
relative price under costless trade equilibrium.
Table 1: Comparison of the models
Technology Autarky Complete specialization
Linear-in-labor
pBi
pAi
=
Ai
Bi
pB
pA
=

1  
A1
B2
Cobb-Douglas
pBi
pAi
=
Ai
Bi
pB
pA
=
 
+ 
R 
1  
!1 
A1
B2
Putty-clay
pBi
pAi
=
Ai
Bi
1 (zAi  Ai )
(1 (zAi ))
1 
1 (zBi  Bi )
(1 (zBi ))
1 
pB
pA
=
 
+ 
R 
1  
!1 
A1
B2
1 (zA1  A1 )
(1 (zA1 ))
1 
1 (zB2  B2 )
(1 (zB2 ))
1 
Notes: i = 1; 2 is country,  = A;B is industry,  is consumption share of good B in the period-utility,
R = 1=   1 + ,  is subjective discount factor,  is depreciation rate,  is capital's share in the
production function, and z is utilization rate (see equation (27)). Complete specialization is a case in
which country 1 specializes in production of good A, and country 2 specializes in production of good B.
The relative price under costless trade of the putty-clay model is (37), and Table 1
compares these three models. As is clear from Table 1, the implication of these models is
Ricardian. The pattern of comparative advantage is determined by the relative price under
autarky, and it is fully captured by the industry-level Solow residuals. In the case of the
putty-clay technology, not only the mean level of productivity () but also the magnitude of
the heterogeneity () contributes to the measured Solow residual.
The relative price under costless trade with perfect specialization is determined by both
demand and supply conditions. When we compare the linear-in-labor and Cobb-Douglas
production technologies, the dierence is driven by the presence of investment. In the case
of the Cobb-Douglas production technology, technology is homogeneous within country and
industry. The mean productivities are the key indicators capturing the autarky relative
price and the pattern of trade. In the case of the putty-clay technology, selection across
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heterogeneous capital goods additionally aects supply.
2.3 The balanced growth economy
By including capital-embodied technological progress, the model provides additional predic-
tions regarding productivity variation, industry-level productivity, and the vintage of capital
goods. Suppose that technology is improving, and it is embodied in the capital goods; specif-
ically, the mean productivity has a common trend growth, E(i()) = 

i;t = (1 + g)
t(1 )i.
Let variables without time subscripts denote their values on the balanced growth path. The
analysis in Section 2.2 is a special case in which g = 0. When g > 0, the calculations are
not as simple as in the case of g = 0. In particular, with trend growth of technology, an old
machine is generally less productive than a new machine. Accordingly, the cuto depends
on the vintage of the capital. Since newer machines are in general more productive than
older machines, the ratio of operation of an \s + 1 periods old" machine is lower than that
of an \s periods old" machine.
The cuto variable zis depends on the vintage of the machine:
zi;s =
1
i
ln

wi
pi

ik

i


+ 0:5i +
s
i
ln(1 + g): (43)
Since g > 0, zi;s+1 > zi;s. A higher z means a larger fraction of machines is below the
operational cuto.
As shown in the Appendix, the condition corresponding to (27) for g > 0 involves zi;s
for s = 1; 2; :::. Gilchrist and Williams (2005) show that even when g > 0, the existence
of zi;s is always ensured. Moreover, they show that under a mild condition z

i;s is uniquely
determined.
Once zi;s is determined, the industry-level output can be expressed as a generalized
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version of (32):
yi = 

i(g + )

 1X
s=1
(1 + g) s(1  )s 1  1    zi;s   i
!
 1X
s=1
(1  )s 1  1    zi;s
!1  Ki li1 : (44)
Since zi;s depends on 

i , the Solow residual depends on 

i .
Figure 2 illustrates the relationship between , vintage, and capacity utilization rate
(1   (zi;s   i)).16 If  is large, the selection works even immediately after installation,
that is, some machines are not used even if they are new. As time passes, the utilization
rate gradually declines because these machines are relatively less productive than newer
machines. This relationship between vintage and selection holds regardless of the value of
, while the pattern is dierent. If  is small, productivity variation among machines in
the same vintage is small. Most of the machines are initially used, and the utilization rate
sharply drops once the vintage of machines becomes outdated.
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Figure 2: Sigma, vintage, and capacity uti-
lization rates
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Figure 3: Sigma, average vintage, and Solow
residual
16The calibration strategy basically follows Gilchrist and Williams (2000, 2005). One period of the model
is quarter. Parameter values are as follows. The capital-share in the production is 0:3 ( = 0:3). The annual
depreciation rate is 8% ( = 1  (1  0:08)1=4). The annual trend growth rate is 2% (g = (1 + 0:02)1=4   1).
The subjective discount factor is determined so that the implied annual real interest rate is 4% if g = 0
( = (1=1:04)1=4). The share of leisure in the utility function is 0:3 ( = 0:3) when I include labor-leisure
choice. The mean productivity is set to 1 ( = 1).
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One important factor implicit in Figure 2 is the exogenous retirement by . As time
passes, more machines break. The total mass of old machines is not large, however. In
Figure 3, the dotted-line with left-axis-scale shows the average vintage of operating machines
for dierent values of . When  is small, most of the machines are active until a certain
age. Due to the exogenous retirement, the average vintage is about 8.5 years if  = 0:05.
As  increases, the selection contributes to the industry-level productivity. Less productive
machines are not used even in the initial period, and as time passes, more and more machines
are replaced by younger machines. The average vintage is even smaller than the case of a
small .
The solid-line with right-axis scale of Figure 3 illustrates the relationship between  and
the industry-level Solow residual calculated by (44). When  is small, the selection does not
contribute to the industry-level productivity. If  is large, the industry-level productivity is
observed to be large, thanks to the selection.
In summary, if  is large, the selection eliminates less productive machines from operation.
The operating machines are young and more productive, and hence the average vintage of
active machines is small. An industry using young machines tends on average to be more
productive than other industries.
The rest of the analysis is basically the same as the case of g = 0. If an industry has
higher  than another, the productivity is higher. Observationally, an industry is more
productive if the industry uses young machines on average and/or the capacity utilization
rate of industry is low. If productivity is high, the relative price of the good is low under
autarky. This relative price is an indicator of trade patterns when countries are engaged in
trade.
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3 Fixed trade cost and sorting implication
This section presents an extension of the model. The extended model describes a sorting
situation in which the most productive machines export, the moderately productive machines
serve the domestic market, and the least productive machines do not operate. Since newer
vintage machines are in general more productive, these machines are more likely to be used
for exporting. The gains from trade in the extended model are the combined and interactive
results of the reallocation across industries by exploiting the comparative advantage, and of
the reallocation across machines within an industry.
In Section 2, good A is a pure consumption good, while good B is used both for consump-
tion and investment. To simplify the analysis with xed trade cost, this section starts from
a modied version of the model. Both goods are intermediate inputs used for producing the
non-tradeable nal goods. The production of the nal goods is given by an equally-weighted
Cobb-Douglas production function, lnYi;t = 0:5 ln c
A
i;t + 0:5 ln c
B
i;t. The producers of the -
nal goods face perfect competition and their prots are Pi;tYi;t   pAi;tcAi;t   pBi;tcBi;t. The nal
goods are used for the consumption and investment, Yi;t = Ci;t + k
A
i;tq
A
i;t + k
B
i;tq
B
i;t. Finally,
the consumer's period utility is given by the log of consumption and leisure, u(Ci;t; Li;t) =
 lnCi;t + (1   ) ln(1  Li;t).
3.1 Autarky and costless trade
The implications of the closed economy or costless trade are almost identical to the previous
model; as I discussed in the previous section, demand condition plays a minimal role under
autarky and costless trade equilibria. The relative price under autarky is determined by
technology. For example, in the closed-economy of g = 0, the relative price across industries
is given by (33).
Under costless trade, the relative price possibly depends on demand condition. If both
countries specialize in producing one of the two goods, the relative price is given by a modied
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version of (37). Specically, the rst term, which captures relative demand for two goods,
becomes unity due to the symmetry assumption of the two goods.
3.2 Investment decision
I introduce a trade cost via xed labor cost. Namely, to deliver the output yi() of one
machine to the foreign country, the machine requires 1 +  units of domestic labor instead
of one unit of labor for the domestic delivery. Owing to this xed trade cost, price is not
equalized across countries.
In the rest of this section, I will focus on a symmetric situation in which one country
possesses comparative advantage in one industry, while the other country possesses advan-
tage in the other industry. Moreover, the source of the comparative advantage is purely from
the variation term. The mean productivities are assumed to be the same across countries
and industries, and variance is symmetric: A1 = 
B
2 > 
B
1 = 
A
2 . Under these assumptions,
it is sucient to analyze two types of industries: an industry with comparative advantage
(exporting industry) and one without comparative advantage (non-exporting industry). In-
stead of using country subscripts and industry superscripts, I use superscripts f , d, o, and
n, where f is exported values and foreign prices of exporting industry, d is domestically
consumed values and domestic prices of exporting industry, o is exporting industry, and n is
non-exporting industry. By considering a case in which country 1 has comparative advantage
in good A, for example, in country 1, capital-intensity in industry A is attached with o as
ko. Similarly, yo represents the total production of the exporting industry, and it is sum of
the production for domestic supplies (yd) and foreign supplies (yf ), yo = yd + yf . The price
of the exporting good in the home country is pd, and the price of the exporting good in the
foreign country is pf . Let  be the ratio of the two minus one, pf = (1 + )pd.
One might think that  =  , (i.e., pf = (1 + )pd), as is typical in iceberg trade cost
models. However, this is not true. The reason is that if    , all the machines are used
for exporting, and domestic supply is zero. This domestic supply shortfall pushes up the
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domestic price, and shrinks price ratio . Hence, an open-economy equilibrium is consistent
with  <  .
When  <  , the prots from exporting and domestic sales are dierent, and machines
are sorted by their productivities o(). If a machine is suciently productive to satisfy
pft+s
o
t ()k
o
t
   (1 + )wt+s > pdt+sot ()kot    wt+s; (45)
then the machine is used for exporting operation. If a machine is not suciently productive
to satisfy the inequality but covers operational costs (i.e., wages), it is still used for domestic
sales.
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Figure 4: Trade cost, operation decision, and sorting
Figure 4 depicts this sorting situation. The horizontal axis shows the productivity of
each machine, and the vertical axis shows the net income from operation. The solid-line
shows net income from domestic operation. The machine operates if net income is greater
than zero, and is idled if net income is negative. The dotted-line is net income if a machine
is used for exporting operation. The net income is negative even at the domestic operational
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cuto, owing to trade cost. However, if a machine is highly productive, it covers trade costs
and earns larger prots from exports than domestic sales. This sorting pattern is closely
related to ndings in micro-level empirical trade literature (e.g., Bernard and Jensen, 1999).
The investment decision problem takes this sorting into account:
max
kot
  Ptkot + Et
" 1X
s=1
mt;t+s(1  )s 1

 Z 1
wt+s
t+sp
d
t+sk
o
t


pft+s
o
t ()k
o
t
   (1 + )wt+s

f(
o
t ()jwt+s; pdt+s; pft+s; ot )dot ()
+
Z wt+s
t+sp
d
t+sk
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t

wt+s
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 
pdt+s
o
t ()k
o
t
   wt+s

f(
o
t ()jwt+s; pdt+s; pft+s; ot )dot ()
!#
: (46)
For each vintage s, there are two cut-os, zds for domestic operation, and z
f
s for exporting.
As shown in the Appendix, on the balanced growth path, two cutos are linked by zfs =
zds +
1
o
ln(=). In the case of g = 0, two cutos zd and zf are summarized by the following
equation, which is an extension of (27):
1   = 

(zf   o)
(zf )
(1  (zf )) + 1  (zd)
 (1  (zf   o)) + 1  (zd   o) : (47)
Note that  is an endogenous variable, which ultimately depends on zf . Hence, the
equilibrium is a xed point for solving , zd and zf , which are consistent with (47) and other
steady-state equilibrium conditions. If g > 0, a condition extending (47) includes zds and z
f
s
(see the Appendix), but the equilibrium is similarly calculated.
I solve the equilibrium numerically.17 The mean productivities are o = n = i = 1 for
all i and . Gilchrist and Williams (2005) set  = 0:2 for their baseline analysis. Here I
set o(= A1 = 
B
2 ) = 0:35, and 
n(= B1 = 
A
2 ) = 0:15. From the results obtained in the
previous sections, country 1 possesses comparative and absolute advantages for producing
good A, and country 2 possesses comparative and absolute advantages for producing good
17See footnote 16 for other parameter values.
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B. For trade cost, I examine the range of  between 0 and 0:2. Under this parameterization,
it turns out that  = 0:2 gives results almost identical to those of autarky equilibrium.
3.3 Vintage, productivity, and operating status
Figure 5 shows the distribution of machines of an exporting industry. The vertical axis shows
quantity of machines, while the horizontal axis shows the labor-productivity of machines,
which is the product of idiosyncratic productivity (()), the contribution of trend growth
(1+ g) s, and capital-intensity (k). The distribution of newly installed machines (the solid
line) is on the right of the distributions of 10-year and 20-year-old machines indicated by,
respectively, the broken and dotted lines. New (small s) machines are, in general, more
productive than old (large s) machines. The quantity of machine of old machine is small,
reecting the exogenous retirement.
New machines are more productive, and hence these are more likely to be in operation.
Furthermore, among new machines, top-tier machines are used for exporting. Old machines
are not only few due to retirement but also less productive due to embodied vintage tech-
nology. This sorting for dierent vintages is also illustrated by Figure 6, which shows the
relationship between vintage and operational status. The gure shows that among new
machines, approximately the top 5% are used for exporting, the middle 70% are used for do-
mestic supply, and the bottom 25% are idle. The fractions of exporting and domestic supply
decrease as machines age. Among 20-year-old machines, the top 35% are in operation, but
almost none of these machines are used for exporting.18
From these gures, the model predicts that (1) more productive machines are more likely
used for exporting, (2) newer machines are more likely used for exporting, (3) if an old
machine is used for exporting, the machine was initially extremely productive.
In the light of the literature, (1) is routinely described using a type of Melitz (2003) model.
However, the baseline Melitz (2003) model is silent about the relationship between opera-
18These numbers depend on parameters, but qualitative implications are robust under reasonable cali-
brations.
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tional status and vintage. My model oers new insights regarding vintage and operational
status.
In this model, a unit of production is a machine. An empirical problem is how to map
the model to data. A simple approach is to consider this production unit as a rm (or
plant). Then, the model's prediction regarding operational status of a machine is regarded
as operational status of the rm. Another, and probably more reasonable, approach is to
think that rm is a collection of multiple machines.
A simple way to include a rm in the model is to follow a three-step procedure. First,
in each period, households determine the total investment of capital-intensity and number
of machines. Second, each rm draws from a lottery, which species the number of ma-
chines to be installed for each rm. Third, idiosyncratic productivity is assigned for each
machine. If nancial and labor markets are perfect, the investment decision of the house-
holds is purely determined by the stochastic discount factor, and is independent from the
inter-rm allocations. Then, the aggregate properties of the equilibrium are the same as the
previous analysis. In this world, some rm have many machines, while other rms have only
a few machines. Some rms have new and productive machines, other rms have old but
productive machines, and still other rms have old and unproductive machines.
This modied model gives not only standard but also several new predictions regarding
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the rm characteristics and exporting status. The model predicts that the standard rela-
tionship between productivity and operation status: (4) more productive rms are likely
exporters, and (5) export intensity is higher for more productive rms. In addition, the
model provides three new predictions with respect to the vintage of machines and export-
ing status: (6) a rm with newer vintage machines is more likely to be an exporter, (7)
among exporters, export intensity is higher for the rm with newer vintage machines, and
(8) a rm starts exporting after an installation of new and productive machines.19 Future
investigations to test these predictions are expected.
3.4 Welfare eects of trade cost reduction
There are two possible types of equilibrium. One is that both countries completely specialize.
This equilibrium is realized if trade cost is small. In particular, if trade cost is zero, the
situation is then exactly the same as costless trade equilibrium. The other equilibrium exists
when both countries produce both goods. This is the case if trade cost is large. When trade
cost is extremely large, the model is eectively the same as autarky. As trade cost decreases,
highly productive machines start to export (as described by Figure 4). However, since the
total number of such productive machines is small, the supply of exporting goods is smaller
than the demand. This imbalance drives up the price of the goods, and stimulates domestic
production. That is, a country lacking comparative advantage in this good continues to
produce.
Figure 7 shows the realized equilibrium values for dierent xed trade cost  . In the
panels, the horizontal axis represents values of  , while the vertical axis represents other
variables. If  = 0, the economy is the same as the costless trade. Similarly, if  is large, the
economy is eectively the same as autarky.
The top-left panel of Figure 7 shows the utilization ratios of newly installed machines
(s = 1) for various operations (ratio of activated, domestic, and exporting operation to total
19I extend appreciatation to one of the referees for encouraging me to include capital-embodied technology
progress, and suggesting implications (6) and (7).
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Figure 7: Eects of change in trade costs
existing machines of the vintage). Under autarky ( = 0:2), no machines are used for ex-
porting operation (ratiof, the dash-dotted-line). As trade cost decreases, more machines are
used for exporting, and fewer are used for domestic supply (ratiod, the solid-line). Capacity
utilization rate of this industry (ratioo (= ratiof + ratiod, the dotted-line) increases as 
decreases until a critical value, and then silightly decreases. This critical value divides the
two types of equilibria, whether n-industry is active or not. The utilization ratio of machines
used in n-industry (ration) is high (approximately 0.999) when the industry is active.
The top-right panel of Figure 7 shows the capital-intensity of o- and n-industry, and the
bottom-left panel shows the quantities of machines. Starting from autarky (right-end), the
capital-intensity of o-industry (ko, the solid-line) gradually increases as trade cost decreases,
and then decreases. As trade cost decreases, more resources are available for o-industry.
A rapid increase in the machines used for exporting is accompanied by a rapid increase in
investment in o-industry. The capital-intensity of n-industry (kn, the dashed-line) remains
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nearly at until the critical value. Under autarky, the capital-intensity is higher in n-industry
than in o-industry, as discussed in Section 2.
The quantity of machines of n-industry (qn) gradually decreases as trade cost decreases.
Since more foreign products are supplied, the production of n-goods in this country de-
creases. This internal supply adjustment occurs through the number of machines since
capital-intensity of this industry remains unchanged. In this phase, a source of aggregate
welfare gain is this inter-industry reallocation.
Once the inter-industry reallocation ends, and two countries completely specialize, the
selection among machines is the only source of industry-level productivity gain. As trade
cost decreases, capacity utilization rate decreases capital-intensity decreases and the number
of machines increases.
A reduction in trade cost denitely increases welfare, but how it changes depends on the
specialization phases. As shown in the bottom-right panel of Figure 7, the utility monoton-
ically increases as trade cost decreases. The change in the phase changes the slope of the
curve. In particular, the welfare gain is largest in the timing of large increase in exporting.
In summary, a reduction of trade cost has two dierent types of impacts: inter-industry
reallocation and intra-industry reallocation. Starting from autarky, a reduction in trade cost
causes inter-industry reallocation. More machines are created in the comparative advantage
industry. The pattern is further amplied by an increase in the capital-intensity of this
industry. At the same time, relatively less productive machines are also activated in the
industry with comparative advantage. Once countries completely specialize, less productive
machines fall idle. This change of the phase leads to a nonlinear impact of trade cost
reduction on welfare. Since nonlinearity is not considered in models analyzed by Arkolakis
et al. (2012), their nding that gains from trade are unexpectedly low in the standard trade
models might, indeed, be explained by the role of nonlinearlity. Exploring this possibility is
an important future research topic.
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4 Conclusion
This paper considers the role of investment and heterogeneity in productivity across capital
goods on the pattern of international trade. Specically, I introduce putty-clay production
technology in the style of Gilchrist and Williams (2000, 2005) into an international trade
model considered by Baxter (1992).
Motivated by several micro-studies, I assume capital goods are heterogeneous due to
idiosyncratic productivity variation and vintage. In a two-country, two-good, two-factor
model, trade pattern is generally described by Ricardian comparative advantage. However,
I nd a new source of comparative advantage: the magnitude of capital goods heterogeneity.
A country has comparative advantage in an industry with relatively larger capital goods vari-
ation. Accordingly, the model predicts that an industry is more likely to have comparative
advantage if the industry uses on average new machines, the industry's capital utilization
rate is low, and capital goods in the industry has large productivity variation.
With xed trade cost, the model describes a sorting situation in which the most pro-
ductive machines (which are generally newer vintage) export, the moderately productive
machines serve the domestic market, and the least productive machines (old) do not oper-
ate. The model gives novel predictions regarding vintage and exporting status: a rm with
newer vintage machines is more likely to be an exporter, among exporters, export inten-
sity is higher for the rm with newer vintage machines, and a rm starts exporting after
an installation of new and productive machines. The gains from trade are the combined
and interactive results of the reallocation across industries by exploiting the comparative
advantage, and of the reallocation across production units within an industry. As a result,
a change in the trade cost has nonlinear implications on the change in the welfare.
The steady-state implications of the investment decision and the aggregation results of
the putty-clay model are suciently simple to incorporate a Ricardian model, although the
underlying investment decision is suciently rich to capture the essential features of capital
goods heterogeneity. This paper presents an extension including xed cost, and there are
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many possibilities to extend the model. One direction is to apply the framework to human
capital investment instead of physical capital investment. Future research is expected.
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